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Sheila Wildeman*

Law and Mental Health: A Relationship
in Crisis?

An Introduction to the Lectures ofSupreme Court of Canada ChiefJustice
Beverley McLachlin and Nova Scotia Provincial Court Judge Anne
Derrick
What is the significance of the rule of law to the area of professional
knowledge and practice that is "mental health"-or to the interaction
of those two .aspirational, one might say euphemistically-named social
systems: the mental health and justice systems? This question centres
upon the rule of law-specifically, I suggest (as I relate further in closing),
a thick conception of the rule of law grounded in an ideal of state-subject
reciprocity'-and not, or not directly, upon the individual and social good
of health. It is this overarching question that I wish to pursue in setting the
*
Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University.
I. As Michael Rosenfeld notes, the rule of law "is an 'essentially contestable concept,' with both
descriptive and prescriptive content over which there is a lack of widespread agreement." ("The Rule
of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy" (2001) 74 Southern Calif LR 1307 at 1308).
A wide-ranging account of theoretical approaches to the rule of law, including approaches taken by the
Supreme Court of Canada in recent years (favouring a "minimalist" conception), is provided by Mary
Liston in "Governments in Miniature: The Rule of Law in the Administrative State" in Administrative
Law in Context, Colleen Flood & Lome Sossin, eds (Toronto: Emond-Montgomery, 2008) 77. Liston
has described the rule of law as registering within the public imagination as "a political good, a public
discourse, and a constitutive component of democratic citizenship." (Mary Liston, "The Rule of Law
Through the Looking Glass" (2009) 21:1 Law and Literature 42 at 43.)
The model of the rule of law that I draw upon centres on the idea that law, or legality, implies a
commitment to public justification of state action (including justification of the actions of statutory
decision-makers exercising powers conferred by law). On this model, the legal values of rationality
and fairness are constituent parts of the work dfjustification and of the rule of law. These commitments
carry an expectation that legal authorities will take account of the significant interests as well as
perspectives of those affected by state action-that is, their perspectives on the facts and also on the
nature and relative weight of the legally-protected interests relevant to a dispute. See David Dyzenhaus,
"Law as justification: Etienne Mureinik's conception of legal culture" 1998 (14) SAJHR 11, and "The
Legitimacy of the Rule of Law", in David Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt & Grant Huscroft, eds, A Simple
Common Lawyer: Essays in Honour of Michael Taggart (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 33.
This approach to the rule of law arguably coincides in certain key respects with the ideas advanced
in an article published by Justice McLachlin (as she then was) in 1992: "Rules and Discretion in the
Governance of Canada" (1992) Sask L Rev 167 (a revised version of the Heald Lecture, College of
Law, University of Saskatchewan, 23 September 1991). There, McLachlin J rejected a conception of
the rule of law that would set laws and court-based law-interpretation (positioned on the side of the
rule of law) against administrative discretion (positioned on 'the side of arbitrariness). Instead, she
argued, the "real issue" in forging a defensible account of the legitimacy of the administrative state
is "finding a rational basis for the exercise of discretion, whether in the courts or in administrative
agencies, with the objective of establishing better decision-making and ensuring that the rule of law is
maintained in the administrative as well as the judicial sphere" (at 167). This is a fitting description of
the ideal of legitimacy that informs the modern law on the review of the substance of administrative
decisions, and in particular, of discretion. It is also an appropriate starting-point for the project of
evaluating the mental health and justice systems in their interaction with persons with mental health
problems. Also see McLachlin Ci, "The Roles of Administrative Tribunals and Courts in Maintaining
the Rule of Law" (1999) 12 Can J Admin L & P 171.
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stage for the two lectures that follow, in which prominent members of the
Canadian judiciary address topics at the intersection of mental health and
the law.
It may be suspected that to take up the relationship between law and
medicine, or more specifically between mental health law and mental
health care, is to confront a deep and perhaps irresolvable divergence of
values and ends: a clash of cultures.2 On one side of this divergence-an
over-simplification which nonetheless reflects the typical contours of these
debates is a position strenuously defended by some members of the mental
health profession. This position, which is one of resistance to law, and
which for some grounds actions expressly defiant of law,3 is rooted in the
argument that law is at best irrelevant to, and at worst an insensitive brake
upon, the therapeutic ends of mental health practice. Indeed it may be
argued that law, as applied to mental health interventions, supports absurd
conclusions: conclusions wholly detached from reality, at least in the
extreme cases in which controversies arise-reflecting a rigid privileging
of abstract individual rights even in the face of grave health risks.4 From
the other side, that of the mental health lawyer, may come the retort that
our deepest human interest is the legally-privileged interest in directing
our lives in accordance with our own values and experiences: the interest
in personal autonomy. The lawyer may add, moreover, that mental health
professionals are too quick to disrupt ordinary legal presumptions of
2.
See Michael Bay, "Making the Law Match the Reality; Making the Reality Match the Law"
(2006) 1 Ethics in Mental Health 4 at 4-5. The theme is developed also in Paul Appelbaum's influential
Almost a Revolution: Mental Health Law and the Limits of Change (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994).
3. Numerous commentators have exposed the absence of concern for law in institutional practices
of forensic and civil psychiatric committal and involuntary psychiatric treatment. See, e.g., Jill
Peay, Tribunals on Trial: A Study of Decision-Making under the Menial Health Act 1983, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989); Decisions and Dilemmas: Working with Mental Health Law (Oxford: Hart,
2003); Lora Patton, "These Regulations Aren't Just Here to Annoy You: The Myth of Statutory
Safeguards, Patient Rights, and Charter Values in Ontario's Mental Health System" (2008) 25 Windsor
Rev Legal & Soc Issues 9; Aaron A Dhir, "The Maelstrom of Civil Commitment in Ontario: Using
Examinations Conducted during Periods of Unlawful Detention to form the Basis of Subsequent
Involuntary Detention under Ontario's Mental Health Act" (2003) 24:2 Health L Can 9; Michael
Bay, ibid. See also Peter Bartlett, "Introduction" to the Special Volume: Perspectives on Law and
Psychiatry: Exploring the Legal and Social Issues Surrounding Mental Disability (2008) 25 Windsor
Rev Legal & Soc Issues 5; and Peter Bartlett, "Psychiatric Treatment: In the Absence of Law?: Case
note on R (on the application of B) v Ashworth Hospital Authority and another [2005] UKHL 20"
(2006) 14 Medical L Rev 122.
4.
For the argument that there is "too much process" in the psychiatric system (as that argument
has been raised in the US context), and that the time has come for the pendulum of legal process
protections to shift back to a less adversarial model, see Samuel J Brakel & John M Davis, "Overriding
Mental Health Treatment Refusals: How Much Process is "Due?" (2008) 52 Saint Louis ULJ 501. In
Canada, the work of John Gray & Richard O'Reilly pursues a related line of argumentation. See, for
instance, John E Gray & Richard L O'Reilly, "Supreme Court of Canada's 'Beautiful Mind' Case"
(2009) 32 Int J of Law & Psychiatry 315.
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individual liberty, capacity and decision-making authority, as if the power
to do so flowed from medical expertise alone rather than from the specific
terms of one or another publicly-conferred, carefully-circumscribed legal
mandate.'
In light of such divergent perspectives, we may ask: what common
values, what common principles and indeed common challenges can
we identify in order to better orient mental health law and mental health
care toward the shared project of advancing the fundamental interests of
persons experiencing mental health problems, and most particularly, those
most vulnerable to mental health crisis? At the same time, what dangers'
(in particular, what dangers for the rule of law) may lie in the attempt to
coordinate the values and ends of mental health law and mental health
care? These are among the matters that must be confronted if we wish to
face the challenges, one might say the state of emergency,6 marking the
interaction of the justice and mental health systems in Canada.
The two lectures that follow take up various dimensions of these
complex social and legal questions, and encourage us to test the
assumptions we bring to the debates. The first, entitled "Medicine and
the Law: The Challenges of Mental Illness," was delivered by Chief
Justice Beverley McLachlin of the Supreme Court of Canada,' in Halifax,
Nova Scotia, in October 2010.8 In her remarks, McLachlin C.J. recounts
historical developments in societal attitudes toward mental illness and
accompanying developments in mental health law, both in the criminal
and civil spheres. She concludes that while law has progressed some way
in overcoming the discriminatory attitudes and institutional expressions
thereof which prevailed in the not-so-distant past, there remains progress
to be made-including, but not limited to, more adequate resourcing of
5.

See the articles cited in supra note 3. The point is made with particular force by Michael Bay,

supra note 2.

6.
The lectures that follow alert us to the ways in which what may seem a set of disconnected or
random "tragedies" involving conflicts between public authorities and persons with mental-health
problems are better understood as indicia of systemic societal problems of a magnitude that I suggest
merits the descriptor "state of emergency." At the same time, the descriptor has a more sinister edge, as
the concept of the state of emergency plays an important role-not only in medical law but, of course,
in national security law-in grounding "exceptional" forms of state action forgoing adherence to the
ordinary expectations of the rule of law.
ChiefJustice McLachlin was sworn in as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada in April 1989.
7.
She was appointed Chief Justice of Canada on 7 January 2000. As I note in more detail further on, the
speech reproduced for publication in this journal is one of many public addresses and publications that
she has produced during her tenure on the Supreme Court.
8.
This was the Dr Saul Green Memorial Lecture, given on 19 October 2010. A substantially similar
lecture was given in Alberta under the title "Medicine and the Law: The Challenges of Mental Illness,"
remarks given in honour of Justice Michael O'Byrne at the Universities ofAlberta and Calgary, and 17
and 18 February 2005 <http://www.scc-csc.gc.calcourt-cour/julspe-dis/bm05-02-17-eng.asp>.
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legal guarantees (e.g., to ensure that one does not languish in lock-up while
awaiting psychiatric assessment)' and increased coordination among the
justice and mental health systems. The final part of her essay addresses
continuing patterns of discrimination against persons with mental illness,
as expressed in attitudinal and structural barriers to participation in a range
of basic social goods, from employment to health care, and in the form of
violence, including violence on the part of public authorities.
The second lecture, "'We Shall Not Cease from Exploration': Narratives
from the Hyde Inquiry about Mental Health and Criminal Justice," was
delivered by Nova Scotia Provincial Court Judge Anne Derrick,"o again in
Halifax, in February 2011.11 In this lecture, Judge Derrick draws upon her
experience presiding over a Fatality Inquiry (under the Nova Scotia Fatality
Investigations Actl 2 ) regarding the November 2007 death of Mr. Howard
Hyde-though her lecture also strikes new ground in addressing matters
beyond the scope of that Inquiry. The Inquiry in question commenced in
9., This problem is discussed by McLachlin CJ at 25, with reference to the Ontario case R v Hussein
(2004), 191 CCC (3d) at para 33, 26 CR (6th) 368 (Ont Sup J). But see the subsequent decision of the
Ontario Court of Appeal, R v Phaneuf [2010] OJ no 5631, 104 OR (3d) 392, upholding a decision of
the Divisional Court [2009] OJ no 5618, which questioned a reading of Hussein which would require
that a criminal accused must be immediately transferred to hospital upon the ordering of a psychiatric
assessment. In a postscript at paras 28-32, the Court of Appeal supplies procedural guidelines whereby
the constitutionality of a period of detention while awaiting psychiatric assessment may be assured.
Also see the more recent decision of Nordheimer J of the Ontario Superior Court in Centrefor
Addiction and Mental Health v Al-Sherewadi, 2011 ONSC 2272, [20111 OJ no 1755. This judgment
overturns a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice refusing to issue a treatment order because the
accused was to be held in a provincial detention centre before transfer to forensic hospital. In the
decision below, Hogan 3had issued a warrant of committal requiring that the accused be transferred to
the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health-which had advised that no forensic beds were available,
and that as a result, the accused would be taken to a holding cell at a division of the Toronto Police
Service. In his decision, Nordheimer J comments on the recent tendency ofjudges of Ontario's Mental
Health Court to issue warrants of committal under s 672.46(2) of the Criminal Code, where the
Crown is not able to assure immediate transfer to a forensic hospital for the purpose of carrying out
a treatment order or psychiatric assessment. Nordheimer J states: "Just as a person who is arrested
cannot expect an immediate bail hearing, or a person who is charged with a criminal offence cannot
expect an immediate trial, similarly a person who is found to have a mental illness cannot expect
immediate treatment. To hold otherwise is to insist on a system of perfection that is unrealistic in
any normal society." Commentary upon the decision is provided by April Lim, "Debate over putting
mentally ill behind bars stirred by court ruling" (Postmedia news: 21 April 2011) online: Global News
<http://www.globalnews.ca/health/Debate+over+putting+mentally+behind+bars+stirred+court+rulin
g/4658 11 0/story.html>.
10. Judge Anne Derrick was appointed to the Provincial and Family Court of Nova Scotia in
September 2005. Prior to that, her legal practice centred upon public interest and equality litigation,
as well as criminal defense work. She has participated widely in public, professional and judicial
education efforts, having delivered over seventy 'public addresses since the late 1980s, from keynote
speeches and plenary panel presentations at national conferences to lectures and workshops given to
students and community advocacy organizations.
I1. This was the 34th Annual Horace E Read Memorial Lecture (2011). Horace E Read was Dean of
Dalhousie Law School from 1950-1964.
12. FatalityInvestigations Act, SNS 2001, c 31.
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2009 and extended over many months, with a Report released in December
2010.13 As Judge Derrick relates, Mr. Hyde's death in a Nova Scotia
correctional facility followed a set of interactions with police, health care,
and correctional authorities which together signalled a deep failure on the
part of these public authorities to respond sensitively or appropriately to
his needs and interests, including his historical and immediate struggles
with mental health problems. Judge Derrick's lecture draws significantly
upon the groundwork of the Hyde Report, specifically her attention in
that report to the ways that a range of institutional actors interacted with
Howard Hyde during his final days, and her analysis of the policies and
practices most relevant to those interactions. Thus Judge Derrick's lecture,
like her Report, brings together the personal elements of Howard Hyde's.
story with a broader account of the function or dysfunction of a range of
societal and institutional forces in order to illuminate the failings of, and
possibilities for change within, the mental health and justice systems.
Each of these lectures thus affords a glimpse into the mind of a
respected jurist as she endeavours to expand her own and the general
public's awareness of challenges at the intersection of the mental
health and justice systems. The challenges adverted to include, among
others, the phenomenon of criminalization of mental illness (i.e., the
overrepresentation of persons with mental health diagnoses in the criminal
justice system, a phenomenon commonly linked to the joint operation
of stigma and a lack of material, social and therapeutic supports in the
community).14 In addition, and relatedly, the lectures suggest the failure
of public authorities on both sides of the justice / mental health divide
to recognize-or to have received the educational and other resources
required to adequately recognize-the humanity of those experiencing
mental health problems and mental health crises in particular." Finally,
both lectures invite us to reflect upon developments in and beyond law
that hold out the possibility of meaningful reforms.
I have suggested that we may look to these lectures for elucidation of
the significance of law, or of the rule of law, to the ways that the justice
13. Nova Scotia, Inquiry under the Fatality Investigations Act, SNS 2001, c 31 into the Death of
Howard Hyde, In the Matter of a Fatality Inquiry Regarding the Death of Howard Hyde (Halifax:
Nova Scotia Provincial Court, 2010) <http://www.courts.ns.ca/hyde inquiry/hydeinquiryreport.
pdf> [Hyde Report].
14. See Derrick J at 45-50. While Chief Justice McLachlin does not use the term "criminalization",
she adverts both to the high numbers of persons with diagnosed mental illness in the correctional
system (at 16), and to the thesis that if increased supports and coordination of mental health and legal
systems were in place, it might be possible to avert such mental health crises as attract the attention of
the criminal justice system (at 15-17, 30-32).
15. See McLachlin CJ at 25-26, 30-32; Derrick J at 41-42, 46-50 and 58.
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and mental health systems interact in affecting our lives: most particularly,
when we are most vulnerable to psychological distress and to social forces
of marginalization, exclusion, and violence. Indeed, one may expect
a certain level of agreement between them on the basic thesis that law
demands of the mental health and justice systems a certain faithfulness,
both independently and in their interaction, to the values inscribed in our
legal order. Such faithfulness or fidelity to law must necessarily encompass
the universal guarantees registered in the CanadianCharterofRights and
Freedoms,16 including the right to equality and to liberty (which in turn may
be understood to ground the right to individual autonomy), in addition to
the essential rule of law expectation of congruence between the law on the
books and the law as applied. And yet, while both lectures adhere to these
general statements of legal principle, they may by no means be reduced to
a singular shared prescriptive claim or set of claims.
In order to facilitate the reader's critical appreciation of the two
lectures, let me briefly take up some areas of common ground as well
as differences between them. I address, in turn, (1) starting-points, i.e.,
the institutional positions from which each lecturer begins in approaching
her subject; (2) the nature and scope of the analyses, i.e., the different
aspects of the vast subject of mental health and the law taken up in the two
lectures; and (3) the prescriptive dimensions of the lectures.
(1) Starting-points
The fact that Chief Justice McLachlin and Judge Derrick have delivered
these lectures at all arguably speaks to a historical shift in judicial attitudes
and norms of judicial conduct in Canada. That is, in contrast to previous
eras in which our judges tended to be more assiduously disengaged from
the public sphere except where possessed of a specific legal mandate, it is
now recognized that among the many functions proper to the judicial roleconsistent with the guarantees of judicial independence and impartiality,
and perhaps even implicit in the duty to protect the rule of law"-is that of

16. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982,
c 11.
17. Chief Justice McLachlin has indicated that it is among the duties of Canadian civil servants to
engage in public discourse about the institutions of governance that advance the rule of law at the
domestic as well as international levels. Moreover, she has made it her own practice to do so. In an
address to senior public servants at the 2004 Assistant Deputy Minister Forum, she stated: "[I]n my
experience, when Canadians speak of the institutions that foster tolerance, inclusion, and respect for
human rights, many around the world are willing to listen. We must continue to speak, and we must
continue to be heard." Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, PC, "Globalization,
Identity and Citizenship (ADM Forum, Ottawa, 26 October 2004) online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.cal
court-cour/ju/spe-dis/bmO4-10-26-eng.asp>.

Law and Mental Health: A Relationship in Crisis?

7

engaging the public on the challenges facing the justice system." Or if this
function was recognized in limited fashion in the past, it is now afforded
more breadth. Just so, these lectures are directed not simply at elucidation
of points of law or doctrine, nor at mere description of facets of the justice
system, but rather at identifying, within the interaction of the mental
health and justice systems, certain stressors upon and challenges to the
fundamental values inscribed in our laws. Yet even as both lectures evince
the expanded ambit of publicity implicit in contemporary understandings
of the judicial role, they also reflect distinct institutional positions or
starting-points, as I will explain.
Near the beginning of Chief Justice McLachlin's remarks, she relates
that the depth of the challenges raised to law and to the justice system by
the prevalence and complexity of mental illness was brought home to her
by the remarks of a police officer with whom she happened to be dining.
Of course, this is less a causal explanation of how she came to regard this
topic as a matter of public concern than a rhetorical device, illustrating the
significance of the matters she seeks to address as viewed from the front
lines, specifically from the vantage of policing. At the same time, Chief
Justice McLachlin's opening device conveys something of her isolation,
in her institutional capacity as the Chief Justice of Canada's final appellate
court, from the operational concerns faced by those populating the lower
orders of the justice and mental health systems. Indeed, McLachlin C.J.'s
lecture may be understood in part as seeking to bridge the gap between her
institutional position and more practically-informed perspectives. That is,
her lecture arguably seeks to link up the law on the books with the law as
it manifests in life, both in adopting a broad law-and-society approach to
the history of criminal and civil legal doctrine targeting those with mental
health problems, and in adverting to the incidence (through references to
18. See Canadian Judicial Council [CJC], Ethical Principlesfor Judges (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial
Council, 1998), Principle 6 (Impartiality) & Commentary (esp D.3, 6 & 7):
Principle D.3(d) recognizes that, while restraint is the watchword, there are limited
circumstances in which a judge may properly speak out about a matter that is politically
controversial, namely, when the matter directly affects the operation of the courts,
the independence of the judiciary (which may include judicial salaries and benefits),
fundamental aspects of the administration of justice, or the personal integrity of the judge.
(Principle 6, Commentary D.6 at 42)
Also see McLachlin CJ, "The Changing Role of the Supreme Court of Canada and its Judges" (address
to the County of Carleton Law Association Conference, 17 November 1990) at 14. The Supreme
Court of Canada website provides links to twenty-five speeches given by Chief Justice McLachlin
since her appointment as Chief Justice in 2000. She gave eight speeches in 2004 alone. See <http://
www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-cour/julspe-dis/index-eng.asp>. LexisNexis lists 15 articles by Chief Justice
McLachlin, some of which, though not all, are published versions of speeches. That list does not
capture monographs, and so leaves out, for instance, the article included in the Tribute to John Fleming
noted in footnote 19, infra.
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legal judgments as well as the daily papers) of historical and ongoing
discrimination against and victimization of those deemed mentally ill.19
Finally, Chief Justice McLachlin's lecture suggests an effort to reach
beyond her institutional role in order to specifically acknowledge advances
in medicine that she suggests may assist in abating the challenges that she
invokes..
I have already noted that Judge Derrick's starting-point is her recent
experience presiding over the Fatality Inquiry into the Death of Howard
Hyde. This institutional standpoint conditions the set of perspectives she
is able to draw upon in her lecture. The extraordinary access of the Inquiry
to a range of witnesses-from persons intimate with Mr. Hyde, to police,
hospital, and correctional workers, to experts offering evidence on various
features of the wider mental health and legal systems As they interact with
persons experiencing mental health problems-amounts to a considerable
expansion of the matters to which a judge may typically attend when
adjudicating an inter partes dispute.20 At the same time, the focus of the
Inquiry upon the singular event of Mr. Hyde's death roots Judge Derrick's
observations in the humanity and singularity of this individual and his
story. Thus if Judge Derrick has a certain advantage in the starting point
of her observations, it is one afforded by the institutional mandate of the
public inquiry in which she has participated, which goes some 'distance
toward bridging the gap between the judicial role and the expertise of those
at the front lines of the mental health and justice systems. That said, we
may consider also how her position as a Provincial Court Judge, assigned
specifically to criminal matters requiring lengthy trials, may condition her
perspective.

19. Chief Justice McLachlin's efforts to bridge the gap between the court of last resort and the
lived experience of legal subjects are represented concretely in the many public lectures that she has
given (see supra note 18). That bridge runs both ways. For instance, McLachlin CJ has indicated
that the "public mood" as regards the current state of the law should play a role in informing judicial
interpretation and development of the common law. See her article "Negligence Law-Proving the
Connection" in Torts Tomorrow: A Tribute to John Fleming, Nicholas Mullany & Allen Linden, eds
(LBC Information Services: Sydney, 1998) 16 at 34: "At this point, however, a final and overarching
policy point forces itself upon us. While lawyers debate the niceties of whether a given change may
unduly favour plaintiffs or defendants, the public mood is changing and threatening to eclipse the
legal debate ... If the tort system is unable to meet public perceptions about justice, people may turn
elsewhere. . . [and] recourse to private dispute resolution may have adverse consequences on the
justice system" (35).
20. The CJC's Ethical Principlesfor Judges states: "Where the terms of reference require, judges
serving on Commissions of Inquiry may exercise greater latitude in commenting on issues relevant to
the inquiry." (supra note 18 at Principle 6, Commentary D.6 at 42).
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(2) Nature andscope of analysis
Having proceeded from these different starting-points, the two lectures offer
distinct analyses of different (though overlapping) aspects of the mental
health and justice systems. Chief Justice McLachlin makes her points in
broad strokes, covering volumes of historical and doctrinal material in the
brief span of her remarks. As noted, her lecture surveys a set of important
subjects at the intersection of law and mental health care. She traces certain
fundamental historical shifts in the attitudes of Canadians toward, and the
legally-condoned treatment of, those deemed mentally ill or intellectually
disabled, while speaking more specifically to doctrinal shifts relating to
criminal responsibility and the legal consequences of a finding of not
criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, the civil standards
for involuntary hospitalization and treatment, and the intransigence of
societal discrimination against and victimization of persons with mental
illness. The arc of these observations suggests that progress has been made
toward fashioning appropriate responses to persons with mental health
problems, both in legal doctrine and in the justice system more broadly,
although structural and attitudinal barriers to full social membership have
proven difficult to uproot. In particular, McLachlin C.J. transmits the idea
that progress in medical knowledge has been a significant factor in driving
positive social and legal change. At the same time, she acknowledges that
what counts as progress in law is not universally agreed upon, as reflected
in ongoing contestation about the substantive content of the value of
autonomy as it informs the legal analysis of capacity to make decisions
about treatment.21
Judge Derrick's lecture proceeds from the narrative of Howard Hyde's
encounters with the mental health and justice systems to a set of reflections
on the wider social forces implicated in that narrative. These include forces
of stigma and criminalization, and with this, the ways in which facets of
the mental health and justice systems, viewed within the wider context
of a failed social safety net, have functioned to deepen the oppression of
persons with mental illness. Indeed Judge Derrick's reflections do not stop
at the factors of direct relevance to Howard Hyde's death, but encompass
questions about intersecting grounds of oppression (i.e., the significance of
characteristics such as class, race and sex to one's experience of the mental
health and justice systems) and the unique challenges facing persons with
mental health problems who are held in the federal correctional system.

21.

McLachlin CJ at 30.
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McLachlin C.J. is ultimately more sanguine than is Judge Derrick as
she traces out a narrative of medical and legal progress. Yet her lecture
nonetheless alerts us to a range of doctrinal and institutional settings
in which the sensitivity of public authorities and public institutions to
persons experiencing mental health problems must continue to be placed
in question. Judge Derrick's remarks are rooted less in a model of progress
than one of co-implicated institutional barriers, suggesting that the mental
health and legal systems have together come'to participate in a culture of
crisis, marked by a coincidence of systemic neglect and targeted coercive
interventions in the lives of persons with mental health problems.
(3) Prescriptions
Finally, these two lectures may be understood to differ in important
respects in their prescriptive elements, even as they share certain basic
normative commitments.
The differences in the prescriptive dimensions of the lectures are
illustrated by the following example. At one point, Chief Justice McLachlin
observes that the development of mental health courts represents an
important institutional advance toward uniting the mental health and
justice systems in the common cause of assisting in the recovery of persons
experiencing mental health problems.22 in contrast, Judge Derrick points
out that mental health courts are not a solution, or not a complete solution,
to the deep systemic failings conducive to criminalization. Indeed, she
suggests that mental health courts may reproduce stigma, even as they fail
to remedy the lack of accessible social supports that might avert the crises
that attract the attention of the criminal justice system in the first place. 2 3
More broadly, the two lectures differ in the manner in which they
represent the place of law in responding to the problems that they expose.
Justice McLachlin's lecture culminates in observations on the distinct yet
inter-related mandates of medicine and law in answering the challenges that
her lecture recounts. On the one hand, the challenge she puts to medicine
at the close of her lecture is to increase knowledge of the "causes and
possible courses of treatment" 24 of mental illness. On this approach, the
contribution from medicine centres upon a biomedical model of illness and
health. And what is the challenge put to law? McLachlin C.J. states that
while laws cannot in themselves achieve the "ultimate goal" of restoring
mental health, laws can "create a social and regulatory environment that
assists medical professionals in delivering their services in a manner that
22.
23.
24.

McLachlin CJ at 26.
Derrick J at 51-52.
McLachlin CJ at 33.
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is both ethical and respectful of the rights and needs of the mentally ill."25
Here a certain primacy is accorded to the interests identified under the
medical model. Indeed, the challenge set to law is "to keep pace with
medical developments and ensure that the legal regime governing mentally
ill persons is responsive to the current state of scientific knowledge."2 6 In
this statement is reflected a concern that decisions within the legal system
be informed by science, in particular scientific evidence on the efficacy
and effects of treatment regimes.
One may worry that this prescriptive stance is one that urges law
or legal authorities to adopt a level of deference to medical, or perhaps
particularly psychiatric, knowledge 27 that amounts to "submission to" and
not merely "respect for" this form of administrative expertise. 28 A more
generous reading might conclude that in this passage McLachlin C.J.
urges legal authorities to strike a balance between setting a rights-sensitive
framework for mental health care and allowing mental health professionals
the discretion, within that framework, to determine how best to advance
the substantive goals of the mental health system.
The prescriptive dimensions of Judge Derrick's lecture are more firmly
rooted in the thesis that law must lead any advances toward remedying the
ills of the mental health and justice systems. Relatedly, the prescriptive
dimensions of this lecture evince a particular concern to ensure that both
the mental health and justice systems take account of the perspectives of
those whose significant interests they affect or purport to advance. In this
connection, Judge Derrick directs particular criticism toward the tendency
to attribute mental health crises to the individual's "non-compliance"
with medication-typically asserted in the media and elsewhere with
strong intonations of incapacity, immorality, or both.2 9 In her view, this
25. McLachlin CJ at 33.
26. Ibid.
27. See H Archibald Kaiser, "Canadian Mental Health Law: The Slow Process of Redirecting the
Ship of State" (2009) 17 Health U 139 at 155. Kaiser argues that in this passage, McLachlin CJ typifies
social and legal tendencies toward adoption of a medical model of mental health interventions, which
functions to deflect "broader questions involving discrimination and inequality, and responsibility for
the remediation of these societal blemishes." (154-55). Kaiser's comments are directed at the abovenoted statements as they appear in the version of McLachlin CJ's lecture presented in Alberta in 2005
(supra note 8).
28. 1 refer to David Dyzenhaus's characterization of deference in administrative law, endorsed by
the Supreme Court of Canada in a set of cases beginning with Baker v. Canada (Min of Citizenship
and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 65: "Deference as respect requires not submission but
a respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of a decision" (per
L'Heureux-Dub6 J, citing D Dyzenhaus, "The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy",
in M Taggart, ed, The Province ofAdministrative Law (1997) 279 at 286).
29. Derrick J at 40-42. Also see Erin Talati, "When a Spoonful of Sugar Doesn't Help the Medicine
go Down: Informed Consent, Mental Illness, and Moral Agency" (2009) 6 Ind Health LR 171.
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response fails to register the range and complexity not only of mental
health problems (including the social and institutional factors that may
induce or exacerbate those problems) but also the range and complexity
of individual experiences of medication, which may include significant
side effects or failure to achieve the primary intended effect of alleviating
distressing symptoms, or both.30 The primary work of law, then, as it is
represented in Judge Derrick's lecture, is expressly not to lend legitimacy
to the enforcement of treatment compliance but rather to urge enactment of
the social and material conditions supportive of resilience and recovery.
Those interested in following up the prescriptive dimensions of Judge
Derrick's lecture may consult the eighty recommendations featured in the
Hyde Report.' These recommendations speak to a range of government
departments and public authorities, extending, for example, to the training
of police, hospital, and correctional workers in such matters as crisis
intervention, empathy, communication, and human rights principles, and
more generally to the community-based provision of supports including
therapeutic alternatives. Consistent with her emphasis upon the role of
law in leading reforms to the mental health and justice systems, Judge
Derrick closes her lecture with reference to domestic and international
human rights instruments that may serve as sources of normative authority
in the effort to address the systemic failings that her lecture describes.
As the closing passages point out, the recent U.N. Convention on the
32
Rights of Persons with Disabilities
is of particular note in this regard,
in its recognition of the inter-penetration of human rights and social and
economic supports.
Whether the reader is in the end fully satisfied with the prescriptions of
one or both lectures, and in particular, with their closing characterizations
of the respective roles of law and of medicine in orienting our responses
to the challenges discussed, may depend upon one's initial assumptions
or perspective. If there is a primary point of convergence as between
the two lectures, it is their encouraging us to work in common toward
developments in mental health law and mental health care that might
diminish reliance upon coercive and in particular punitive state responses
to persons with mental health problems-which may be understood to
reproduce historical patterns of discrimination, destructive both of health
and of fundamental legal values.

30. Derrick J, at 40-42.
31. Hyde Report, supra note 13 at 350-83.
32. Convention on the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities,13 December 2006,46 ILM 433, UN Doc
A/RES/61/106.
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Conclusion
We are fortunate to be able to bring together these two lectures, which invite
us to reflect upon the challenges, indeed the crises, marking the interaction
of the mental health and justice systems with persons experiencing mental
health problems in Canada. Here it should be observed that contemporary
trends. in mental health law have tended toward expansion of coercive
mechanisms, expressed, for instance, in various provinces' adoption of
diminished risk thresholds for involuntary hospitalization and regimes of
community treatment orders." In view of this, it is particularly refreshing
to encounter representatives of the judiciary encouraging us to return to
the foundational premises and objectives of our mental health and justice
systems, to ask whether these systems are functioning in a manner that is
adequate to our ideals. It is just such exercises in public deliberation, as
expressed in the narrow arenas of decision-making under law and in the
wider arenas of civil society, that mark us as a nation committed to the
rule of law.
The rule of law may be understood to encompass requirements
of rationality and fairness in law's application, and more generally,
consistency of state action with the fundamental values inscribed in our
legal order.3 4 Viewed in this light, law is not a formalistic brake upon the
pursuit of inherent goods like health, but rather a commitment on the part
of public authorities to be attentive to the significant interests as well as
the perspectives of those who are affected by their decisions and actions.
Authorities within the mental health and justice systems bear a particular
duty of attentiveness to persons experiencing mental health problems, who
have proven vulnerable to state interventions egregiously insensitive to
their interests and perspectives. With these observations, we may link up
the rule of law to the front-line work of fostering respectful conversations
not only among mental health and legal professionals, but among such
professionals and persons experiencing mental illness: conversations
admitting the possibility of alternative ways of conceiving of mental
health problems and therapeutic responses, and reflecting a spirit of mutual
exploration and recognition of the value-laden dimensions of illness and

33. A comprehensive account of the state of provincial mental health laws as well as laws relating to
mentally disordered offenders under the Criminal Code is provided by Peter J Carver, "Mental Health
Law in Canada" Chapter 8 in Canadian Health Law and Policy, 4th ed, Jocelyn Downie, Timothy
Caulfield & Colleen M Flood, eds (Markham Ont: LexisNexis, 2011) 341.
34. See supra note 1.
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wellness. 5 Supporting such exploratory conversations may be the most
effective way of extending the rule of law to the embattled sites at the
intersection of the mental health and justice systems.
I take both these lectures to support the rather radical proposition that
the rule of law, and with this, fairness in the administration of justice,
demands efforts to secure the resources (economic, social, educational,
therapeutic) necessary to demonstrate attentiveness on the part of public
authorities within the mental health and justice systems to the interests
and perspectives of those affected by their actions and decisions. This
means enacting the fundamental values of equality and respect for
autonomy even or most particularly at the "capillaries" 36 of power: the
police booking unit, the hospital, the jail-the sites at which we are most
vulnerable to arbitrary state action. It is our responsibility to reflect on
these challenges, as health care professionals, legal professionals, and
above all, as the democratic public in whose name laws are enacted and
legal authority is bestowed.

35. 1 attempt to draw such connections between rule-of-law values and the assessment of capacity
to make treatment decisions in "Insight Revisited: Relationality and Psychiatric Treatment Decision
Making Capacity," in J Downie & J Llewellyn, eds, Relational Theory and Health Policy, UBC Press,
forthcoming 2011.
36. Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures" in Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings
(1972-77), ed C Gordon (New York: Pantheon Press, 1980) at 96.

